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Abstract
This paper uses an original dataset from a survey conducted in Switzerland in 2007 
to explore the dynamics of education policy preferences. This issue has largely been 
neglected so far as most studies on welfare state attitudes do not look at preferences 
for education. We argue that education policy preferences vary along two dimensions: 
the distribution of resources across different sectors of the education system (i.e. voca­
tional training vs. academic education) and the level of investment in education both 
from public and private sources. With regard to the former, the findings suggest that 
individual educational experience matters most, i.e., individuals prefer to concentrate 
resources on those educational sectors that are closest to their own educational back­
ground. With regard to the second dimension, we find that affiliation to partisan ide­
ologies matters much more than other variables. Proponents of the left demand more 
investment both from the state as well as from the private sector and oppose individual 
tuition fees.
Zusammenfassung
Dieses Papier untersucht die Dynamik bildungspolitischer Präferenzen auf der Mikro­
ebene. Dabei werden Daten aus einer eigenen Erhebung verwendet, die im Jahr 2007 in 
der Schweiz durchgeführt wurde. Die Untersuchung bildungspolitischer Präferenzen 
wurde in der einschlägigen Literatur zur Untersuchung von wohlfahrtsstaatlichen Ein­
stellungen bisher vernachlässigt. Wir zeigen, dass bildungspolitische Präferenzen auf 
zwei Dimensionen zu verorten sind: zum einen die Verteilung von öffentlichen Mitteln 
auf verschiedene Bildungssektoren (berufliche vs. hochschulische Bildung) und zum 
anderen das Gesamtniveau der Bildungsausgaben. In Bezug auf die erste Dimension 
stellen wir fest, dass der individuelle Bildungshintergrund sehr prägend ist. Die Befrag­
ten unterstützten die Konzentration von öffentlichen Mitteln in denjenigen Bildungs­
bereichen, die sie aus der eigenen Bildungskarriere kennen. In Bezug auf die zweite 
Dimension lassen sich hingegen starke ideologische Effekte feststellen. Individuen, die 
sich ideologisch im linken Spektrum verorten, fordern mehr Bildungsausgaben vonsei­
ten des Staates und des Privatsektors und lehnen Studiengebühren eher ab.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies the determinants of individual preferences on education policy, an 
issue that has not yet been studied systematically in the pertinent literature. Although 
a sizable body of literature researching the welfare state has analyzed the determinants 
of individual preferences on various welfare state policies (for a more detailed review, 
see below), it has paid little attention to education. Additionally, the work in the field of 
educational sociology concentrates on studying the determinants of actual educational 
choices, i.e. transitions from one level of education to the next, but not so much the 
preferences on education policies as such. 
We borrow from these two strands of literature to develop an explorative theoretical 
framework, focusing on the contribution of educational background, income, partisan 
affiliation, and institutions to explain education policy preferences. More specifically, 
we look at two dimensions of variation in education policy preferences: the first dimen­
sion is the distribution of public resources amongst different types of education, such 
as vocational training, higher education, or compulsory schooling; the second alludes 
to the role of the state in financing education in relation to private actors, such as in­
dividuals or training firms. In the empirical section, we rely on original data from a 
representative survey conducted in Switzerland in 2007. 
To disclose our findings: educational background and income are important determi­
nants of individual policy preferences concerning the distribution of public education 
spending across different sectors such as academic education versus vocational training. 
Individuals tend to support the concentration of public funding in those educational 
sectors from which they have emanated themselves. However, when it comes to the level 
of public funding, educational background and income have little explanatory power. 
Instead, partisan ideology becomes the dominant determinant of preferences, with pro­
ponents of the left demanding more investments in human capital – both from private 
as well as public sources. Also, we find that institutional context matters: concentrating 
public spending on vocational training is more popular in Swiss cantons with a strong 
tradition in vocational education.
The study of education policy preferences is important from a theoretical as well as an 
empirical perspective. In democratic societies, the policy preferences of individual vot­
ers matter. Of course, although voter preferences are aggregated and filtered by inter­
mediary associations, political parties, and institutions, studies have shown that there 
is a link between individual attitudes and policy output (Wlezien 1995). Boeri, Börsch­
Supan, and Tabellini (2001) document how widespread individual­level support for 
the welfare state poses a formidable obstacle to far­reaching welfare state retrenchment. 
Thus, we hope that the study of education policy preferences will contribute to improv­
ing our understanding of continuity and change in contemporary education systems. 
In particular, the study of the Swiss case can yield answers to the question whether vo­
cational training will remain a viable alternative to academic education in the future or 
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whether the lack of individual support for maintaining routes of vocational education 
will lead to its eventual decline.
The paper is structured as follows: in the first section, we present a brief review of stud­
ies in comparative welfare­state research and educational sociology, identifying the spe­
cific shortcomings of these works and how our paper addresses them. Following that, 
we develop an explorative theoretical framework, which is then tested in the empirical 
section with data from Switzerland. The final section concludes and discusses avenues 
for future research.
2 Literature review
Since the late 1980s (Hasenfeld/Rafferty 1989; Papadakis 1993), a sizable literature 
on the individual­level determinants of social policy preferences has developed. One 
strand within this growing body of work is rooted in political sociology (e.g. Roller 
1999; Arts/Gelissen 2001; Blekesaune 2007; Blekesaune/Quadagno 2003; Jaeger 2009; 
Kangas 1997, 2003; Lipsmeyer/Nordstrom 2003; Lynch/Myrskylä 2009; Van Oorschot 
2006), whereas another analyzes preferences for redistribution from the perspective of 
political economy (Alesina/Angeletos 2005; Alesina/La Ferrara 2005; Alesina/Glaeser/
Sacerdote 2001; Amable 2009; Benabou/Ok 2001; Corneo/Grüner 2000, 2002; Cusack/
Iversen/ Rehm 2006; Fong 2001; Iversen/Soskice 2001; Kenworthy/McCall 2008; Piketty 
1995; Rehm 2009; Scheve/Stasavage 2006). Although direct interaction and cross­refer­
encing between these two strands of literature is often lacking, some parallels between 
the core findings have emerged over the years.
For one, and maybe most importantly, both self­interest and ideology matter in the 
explanation of differences in social policy preferences (Corneo/Grüner 2002; Fong 
2001; Hasenfeld/Rafferty 1989; Kangas 1997; Papadakis 1993). General support for the 
welfare state or redistribution is negatively correlated with income on the micro level, 
because the poor can expect to benefit more from generous welfare state policies than 
the rich (but see Moene and Wallerstein 2003 for a different argument). Moreover, for 
individual social policies with different redistributive implications, it has been shown 
that those who expect to benefit from the program in question are also more support­
ive of its existence (Hasenfeld/Rafferty 1989; Kangas 2003; Van Oorschot 2006). More 
recent work emphasizes the importance of labor market risk (Rehm 2009). According 
to Iversen and Soskice (2001), people with more specific skills are more supportive of 
redistribution, because they face a greater risk of income loss in case of unemployment.1 
1 In a related argument, Wasmer (2006) theoretically demonstrates that a bounteous welfare state 
could be a condition necessary to prompt people to invest in occupation­specific skills versus 
general skills (typically, vocational education as opposed to academic education), because the 
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Thus, in sum, the self­interest hypothesis states that policy preferences of individuals 
are largely determined by their economic position in the context of both the general 
economy and the welfare state.
However, research has also demonstrated that self­interest alone cannot account for 
the observed variety of policy preferences. Ideological orientations matter in addition 
to and beyond pure self­interest. In classic research designs, this question is framed 
in terms of the explanatory power of belonging, on the one hand, to various “transfer 
classes,” which are based on differences in access to the benefits of welfare state policies, 
and on the other, to politico­economic classes (i.e., labor and the bourgeoisie) (Pa­
padakis 1993). Transfer­class cleavages (e.g., old age in the case of pensioners) can cut 
across politico­economic cleavages, so that evidence for the relevance of transfer classes 
is interpreted as support for the thesis of self­interest, whereas the continued existence 
of political alignment within politico­economic classes is taken as support for the rel­
evance of ideological factors. Hence, the relevance of partisan ideology in addition to 
and beyond economic self­interest can simply be controlled for in multivariate regres­
sion analyses by including partisan self­identification as an independent variable (e.g., 
in Bean and Papadakis 1998).
In addition to partisan ideology, general value orientations matter as well. Van Oor­
schot highlights the importance of perceptions of “deservingness” for individual sup­
port regarding different welfare policies (Van Oorschot 2006). Policies aimed at groups 
of people that are perceived as “deserving,” such as old, sick, and disabled people, find 
more support than policies for the “undeserving,” such as immigrants. His findings 
are similar to those in a strand of research in political economy that shows that indi­
viduals who believe that social and economic hardship is a consequence of bad luck or 
fate are more supportive of redistribution than individuals who attribute hardship to 
individual idleness (Alesina/Glaeser/Sacerdote 2001; Fong 2001; Corneo/Grüner 2002; 
Alesina/Angeletos 2005; Alesina/La Ferrara 2005). Scheve and Stasavage (2006) dem­
onstrate how redistributive preferences are also associated with religious orientations. 
More religious persons are less supportive of redistribution because their faith lowers 
the psychological costs of hardship.
Institutional context also matters, although in this field of research, the findings are less 
conclusive and more ambiguous than in the previous ones. A classical topic in compara­
tive welfare state research is to probe whether welfare state institutions shape individual 
preferences. Rothstein (1998) argues convincingly that “just” institutions (i.e., universal 
welfare state institutions that are perceived as being fair) increase the support for the 
welfare state in general. In line with this argument, a number of studies have looked at 
the association between the clustering of support for social policies and Esping­An­
dersen’s “worlds of welfare capitalism” (Esping­Andersen 1990) with the expectation 
more specific the skills are, the greater the risk of remaining unemployed is when the labor 
market undergoes periods of structural change. 
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that support for the welfare state would be strongest in the Scandinavian countries and 
lowest in the Anglo­Saxon world (Papadakis 1993; Bean/Papadakis 1998; Arts/Gelissen 
2001; Blekesaune/Quadagno 2003; Lipsmeyer/Nordstrom 2003). The results, however, 
are far from conclusive. Differences in support between countries do not necessarily 
vary in line with the worlds of welfare capitalism, although recent work by Jaeger (2009), 
using a new methodological approach, seems to yield more robust results. Nevertheless, 
a crucial finding is that welfare state policies are popular in general, even in meager 
welfare states such as the United States (Fraile/Ferrer 2005; Hasenfeld/Rafferty 1989; 
Roller 1999). Of course, one also needs to take into account the fact that most survey 
questions ask about changes in social policy generosity, and respondents in universal 
welfare states might be less supportive of further extensions of the welfare state because 
it is already fully developed. Another general problem is that the direction of causality 
between welfare state institutions and individual preferences is not clear. Brooks and 
Manza (2007), for example, argue that individual policy preferences trigger changes in 
social policy, whereas Kenworthy (2009) questions the validity of that claim by showing 
that the expansion of welfare state generosity preceded an upsurge in popular support. 
In addition to contributions in comparative welfare state research, recent work in edu­
cational sociology might help shed light on the determinants of individual­level pol­
icy preferences. Beginning with the seminal contributions of Breen and Goldthorpe 
(Goldthorpe 1996; Breen/Goldthorpe 1997; see also Esser 1999) in the 1990s and, ear­
lier, Boudon (1974), scholars have tried to answer the question why, despite decades of 
educational expansion, class differences in educational attainment continue to persist 
(Blossfeld/Shavit 1993; Raftery/Hout 1993). Breen and Goldthorpe (1997) show how 
class­related differences in the perception of relative costs and benefits of continued in­
vestments in education constitute class differentials in levels of educational attainment, 
although individual decisions are based on rational choices. Hillmert and Jacob (2002) 
extend the Breen–Goldthorpe model by demonstrating that differences in the percep­
tion of costs and benefits not only affect individual decisions to continue or discontinue 
education, but also the choice between vocational training and general, academic edu­
cation. Given the same choice opportunities, individuals with a lower socio­economic 
background tend to opt for vocational training instead of academic education, because 
they perceive university education as involving higher costs in the form of deferred 
income, a higher risk of failure, and lower benefits, because completion of higher edu­
cation is less necessary to maintain their class position relative to that of their parents 
(Breen/Goldthorpe 1997). Over the years, the Breen–Goldthorpe model and its exten­
sions have found significant empirical support (Becker 2003; Becker/Hecken 2009; Jae­
ger 2007; Stocké 2007). 
What are the shortcomings in the literature and how does this paper address them? The 
most obvious one is that none of the studies introduced above looks at preferences for 
education policy specifically. Studies in the field of comparative welfare state research 
include various social policies as dependent variables, but usually not education, al­
though education is indeed featured regularly as a control variable at the micro level. 
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There are only very few exceptions to this general rule. For example, Busemeyer, Goerres 
and Weschle (2009) find that older people are less supportive of increased spending on 
education in most OECD countries. Grob and Wolter (2007) and Cattaneo and Wolter 
(2009) find similar results for Switzerland. In the US context, Button (1992) shows that 
older people are less supportive of increases in school funding in local referenda. Nev­
ertheless, the general dearth of studies is surprising, because like other social policies, 
policies governing investments in education have obvious redistributive implications. 
However, heeding the fateful claim of Wilensky (1975: 3) that “education is special,” 
comparative welfare state research has tended to neglect the study of education as an 
integral part of the welfare state (Iversen/Stephens 2008). Ex ante, it is an open empiri­
cal and theoretical question whether the associations identified for other social policies 
also hold for the case of education policy preferences. Still, as we will show below, it is 
possible to utilize this literature to devise concrete hypotheses.
Work in educational sociology, however, tries to explain individual educational choices, 
not policy preferences. It seems reasonable to assume that policy preferences are also 
somehow reflected in educational decisions, and, in fact, this is the reason why we in­
troduce this strand of literature here to help develop an explorative framework. Yet it 
might also be the case that policy preferences are genuinely different from educational 
decisions. The reason is that policy preferences are less constrained than actual deci­
sions. Boudon (1974) was the first to point out the importance of the primary and 
secondary effects of class on educational attainment. Breen and Goldthorpe (1997: 277) 
focus on secondary effects, i.e., the way class background affects educational choices, 
given the same level of previous educational attainment. However, because of differences 
in the availability of cultural capital and other resources, we can expect to find class­
related differences in academic ability even without taking educational decisions into 
account (primary effects). Due to the existence of primary effects, policy preferences 
of individuals from lower socio­economic backgrounds might actually be quite dif­
ferent from educational decisions. For example, such individuals could well support 
the expansion of academic education, although they do not believe their own children 
might benefit from it in the short term because of lower academic ability. Hence, the 
comparison of the impact of class on education policy preferences vis­à­vis educational 
choices might shed light on the relative importance of primary versus secondary effects, 
although this issue is not pursued further in the present paper due to the lack of suitable 
empirical data.
3 Theoretical framework
As is the case with all policies, individual preferences in education policy vary tremen­
dously (see Tables 1 and 2 for descriptive data). In our analysis, we focus on aspects of fi­
nancing education. As a plausible point of departure, we posit that individual preferences 
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can be mapped on a two­dimensional matrix. The first dimension captures the distribu­
tion of public moneys across different educational sectors. Primarily, we are interested in 
the distribution of resources between academic education, on the one hand, and voca­
tional education and training, on the other. As will become clear in a moment, this dis­
tinction maps more directly onto current debates in the welfare­state and political­econ­
omy literature than, say, the juxtaposition of compulsory schooling and post­secondary 
education. The second dimension alludes to the distribution of the costs of education 
and the role of the state in financing human capital formation, i.e., whether the costs of 
education should be borne by the state or by private actors, such as individual students or 
training firms. It may well be the case that there are more than two dimensions of varia­
tion or that the two are actually closely correlated, so that they reduce to one common 
factor. Nevertheless, we believe that assuming these two dimensions is a plausible point 
of departure. The findings of the empirical analysis will confirm this hunch.
In the following, we will develop testable hypotheses, inspired by the abovementioned 
literature, about the impact of income, educational background, partisan affiliation, 
and institutions on education policy preferences. However, in comparison with most 
welfare state policies, the causal associations are not as clear­cut in the case of education, 
as will become clear in a moment. Therefore, most of the hypotheses are formulated in 
an open manner, because the literature leads to conflicting, ambiguous, but neverthe­
less equally plausible expectations.
Income and educational background
Income is regarded as an important determinant of redistributive preferences (Meltzer/
Richard 1981; Moene/Wallerstein 2003; Cusack/Iversen/Rehm 2006). In the original 
Meltzer–Richard model, the straightforward expectation is that wealthy people oppose 
redistribution, because they would have to pay more for it, via higher taxes, than they 
could profit from it. In contrast, the less well­off are in favor of redistribution, be­
cause they benefit from higher transfer payments. Recent work has shown that at the 
macrolevel, the predictions of the Meltzer–Richard model do not pan out as expected 
since income inequality and welfare state provision are positively, not negatively, related 
(Iversen/Soskice 2009), which, according to Moene and Wallerstein (2003), can be in­
terpreted as a consequence of the insurance function of social policies (see also Iversen/
Soskice 2001). Nevertheless, at the micro level, a negative association between income 
and support for redistribution is to be expected.
The case of education, however, is less straightforward than purer forms of redistribu­
tion. With regard to our first dimension – the distribution of public moneys across edu­
cational sectors – it seems reasonable to expect individuals to support the concentration 
of resources in the educational sector that they expect their children to attend, which is 
also in line with the logic of “transfer classes” in welfare state research (Bean/Papadakis 
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1998). In a similar vein, it could be expected that individuals support the concentration 
of resources on the kind of education that they themselves have enjoyed. This holds 
true in particular in a country like Switzerland, where vocational training is generally 
regarded as a viable alternative to academic higher education and remains an important 
factor in the socialization of young people into different occupations. 
However, plausible alternative expectations exist. With regard to redistributive preferences, 
the “prospect of upward mobility thesis” (Benabou/Ok 2001) states that the poor will op­
pose redistribution if they expect to become wealthy in the near future – an explanation 
that has been applied plausibly to the case of the United States (Alesina/Glaeser/Sacerdote 
2001: 208). Clearly, education is an important instrument to promote upward social mo­
bility. Therefore, it may well be the case that less well­off people with an educational back­
ground in vocational education support the concentration of public resources in higher 
education, because, as a consequence of the ubiquitous force of educational expansion, 
they expect their children to attend higher education instead of vocational training. 
What is more, wealthy individuals might support the concentration of public resources 
in vocational education instead of higher education. Given the class bias regarding ac­
cess to higher levels of education, wealthy and/or well­educated people expect their 
children to attend university in any case. The promotion of vocational education would 
then serve the purpose of diverting young people from lower income classes from tak­
ing up university study, attenuating competition for access to universities and on high­
skill labor markets. Furthermore, wealthy people do not depend on the public funding 
of higher education to the same extent as middle­class or low­income people do, be­
cause they can resort to private means of funding more easily.
With regard to our second dimension of variation – the distribution of the costs of edu­
cation – the predictions are equally ambiguous ex ante. On the one hand, low­income 
people could support the state taking over a large share of the costs of university educa­
tion, because they believe their children will attend this kind of education in the near 
future and financing obstacles such as tuition fees are more important for less well­off 
people than for wealthy individuals. On the other hand, they could also oppose the ex­
pansion of the state’s share in financing higher education, because they perceive this as 
a redistributive measure from their own class to the upper income ones. Furthermore, 
low­income people and/or individuals with a background in vocational education can 
be expected to support the statement that business should take over more financial 
responsibility in vocational training. For their part, wealthy people clearly benefit from 
state subsidization of the costs of higher education. Therefore, they should support 
the expansion of the role of the state in financing university education. However, the 
very wealthy could oppose further involvement of the state, because they can resort to 
private means of funding and would prefer to keep university education an elite system 
(Ansell 2008). In fact, high­income people could well support both tuition fees, in order 
to limit access to higher education, and the generous subsidization of universities by the 
state, because they benefit most from these subsidies.
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In sum, the impact of income and individual educational background on individual 
education policy preferences is ambiguous from a theoretical perspective. On the one 
hand, it could be expected that individuals with little income and education support 
the concentration of resources in educational sectors close to their own educational 
trajectories, i.e., vocational training, and oppose the expansion of state financing in 
higher (academic) education, because this is perceived to benefit upper income classes. 
Members of the more privileged strata of society would then support the concentration 
of resources on academic education and the participation of the state in shouldering 
a larger share of these costs. On the other hand, members of the lower income classes 
could also support the expansion of academic education, because they believe their 
children will benefit from public support for academic education in the near future. 
The higher income classes could well oppose this expansion of public higher education 
to maintain privileged access to higher levels of education or they could support it if 
they can ensure that limits to access are maintained, e.g., with the help of high tuition 
fees. The empirical analysis below will show which of theses hypotheses receives more 
support. As income and educational attainment are positively correlated, it is important 
to test the hypotheses in a multivariate framework where all the explanatory variables 
are included in the regressions at the same time. 
Partisan identification
In social policy, political parties send out clear signals: leftist parties support the ex­
pansion of the welfare state, while rightist parties oppose it (Castles 1982). Again, in 
education policy, the relationships are more ambiguous, because the redistributive im­
plications of educational investments are not as clear­cut. Some studies find that leftist 
parties support the expansion of education to a similar extent as the expansion of the 
welfare state (Busemeyer 2007; Schmidt 2007). Contrary to this, Ansell, in part follow­
ing Boix (1998), argues that social democratic parties are more reluctant to increase 
investments in higher education, because families from upper income classes – usu­
ally not the core clientele of leftist parties – benefit from this measure to a greater ex­
tent than working­class constituencies (Ansell 2008). Jensen (2011) posits that partisan 
politics in general do not matter much with regard to the level of educational spending, 
which should be understood as a consequence of de­industrialization in conjunction 
with the specific economic institutional context. Finally, Busemeyer (2009) finds that 
the governmental participation of social democrats leads to increased public spending 
on higher education in particular. It is an open question whether this new zeal of the 
left for investments in tertiary education should be seen as an attempt to appeal to new 
voter groups in the middle class or whether it reflects changing education policy prefer­
ences of their core electoral constituencies. 
The present paper can help clear up some of these ambiguities because we can directly 
observe the impact of partisan identification on education policy preferences. Of great­
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est interest here are the education policy interests of proponents of the left, because it is 
on this point that the literature yields the most conflicting predictions. If voters support 
the kind of education closest to their own educational interests and experiences, we 
would expect proponents of the left to support the concentration of public resources in 
vocational education, whereas the sympathizers of the right should support academic 
education. However, as a consequence of educational expansion, the traditional sup­
porters of the left might be keener on expanding public higher academic education 
to promote social mobility for their children. If this were true, “academic drift” would 
contribute over time to the fading out of vocational education. Obviously, these consid­
erations parallel those on the impact of income and education since partisan identifica­
tion is correlated with these two.
Still, partisan affiliation might play a larger role with regard to the second dimension 
of variation in education policy preferences – the distribution of costs between the 
individual, on the one hand, and the state and training firms, on the other. Here, a 
stronger ideological separation between supporters of the left and the right can be ex­
pected above and beyond the impact of income and education, because the relationship 
between public and individual responsibility in the financing of public policies such as 
education is at the core of the left–right dichotomy. More specifically, we hypothesize 
that individuals identifying with the left prefer the state to take over a greater respon­
sibility in financing education, which leads them, for example, to oppose proposals to 
have students pay higher tuition fees and support the expansion of funding for voca­
tional schools. In countries such as Switzerland, where vocational training is largely 
firm­based and costs are shared between the apprentice, the state, and the training firm 
(see Wolter/Mühlemann/Schweri 2006), we could also expect leftist sympathizers to de­
mand that training firms take over a larger share of training costs (e.g., by paying higher 
apprentice wages). In contrast, individuals who identify with conservative parties are 
expected to care less about expanding subsidies to vocational schools and increasing the 
cost share of training firms or tuition fees.
Institutions
Individual preferences are influenced by the institutional context above and beyond the 
hard constraints institutions immediately impose on actors. Institutions define differ­
ent logics of appropriate behavior (March/Olsen 1984) and socialize individuals into 
a specific political and cultural context. Educational institutions, for example, shape 
the perceptions and images of a “decent” education and thus affect educational deci­
sions and policy preferences. Because of strong federalism, the education systems of 
the Swiss cantons differ significantly (Wolter 2007). In German­speaking Switzerland, 
firm­based vocational training in the form of apprenticeships predominates (post­) 
secondary education as it does in Germany. Yet in Latin Switzerland (French­ and Ital­
ian­speaking), school­based vocational education and academic education are more 
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prominent, reminiscent of the state­centered education model of neighboring France. 
Prima facie, we expect stronger support for the concentration of public resources on 
vocational education in the cantons where a larger share of a typical youth cohort goes 
through apprenticeship training. However, in cantons with a low percentage of youths 
in apprenticeship training, “academic drift” is more pronounced; therefore, the general 
support for concentrating public resources on higher academic education is greater. 
Similarly, we expect that residents of cantons with a higher share of either school­based 
vocational or academic education are more supportive of expanding the state’s share in 
financing education, whereas individuals in cantons with strong apprenticeship train­
ing demand a strong involvement of business, i.e., training firms. To study the effect of 
each of these factors separately (ceteris paribus), we will show in Section 6 the results of 
applying multivariate analysis techniques.
4 Data and methods
To study the hypotheses presented in the previous section, we commissioned the pro­
fessional survey institute “Gesellschaft für praktische Sozialforschung” (GfS)2 to collect 
data from a representative sample of Swiss citizens.3 The sample contains information 
on 2,025 Swiss citizens over the age of 25. The data were collected in May 2007 using 
Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI). The interviews were held in Ger­
man, French, or Italian, depending on the language region. Apart from individual socio­
economic and family characteristics, respondents were asked to express their opinion 
on a series of questions concerning education and educational financing.
The goal of this paper is to analyze the determinants of individual preferences for pub­
lic spending as directly as possible, focusing mainly on the influence of educational 
background, income, partisan affiliation, and cantonal institutions. As mentioned in 
Section ­3, we are interested in two dimensions of education financing preferences: the 
sector to which individuals would like public money to be allocated, and whether the 
costs should be borne by the state or by private actors.
2 The GfS institute is one of the leading institutes in Switzerland carrying out opinion polls. It has 
a long tradition in political analyses and representative polls for elections and referenda and is 
therefore well known in the Swiss population.
3 The sample was selected randomly using the Swiss telephone book. The selection was performed 
in several steps. The first step included all people who had a telephone connection. Then it was 
determined how many surveys should be conducted within each language region (based on the 
Swiss census). Within each household, the respondent was also chosen randomly, i.e., the per­
son who had his/her birthday first or last during the calendar year. In addition to the language 
region, there were also quotas for age, gender, education, and marital status, in order to avoid 
bias due to respondents’ reachability. 
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Two specific questions were developed4 to analyze the first dimension, i.e., the distri­
bution of public resources across the different educational sectors.5 The first was: “In 
which educational sector would you prefer public money be spent in the future?” Re­
spondents could choose from five possibilities: preschool, primary or elementary school, 
university­track upper secondary school (Gymnasium),6 vocational training (basic vo­
cational education at the upper secondary level), tertiary education (including higher 
vocational training, academic universities, universities of applied sciences, and teacher 
training colleges), and continuing education. The wording of the second question on 
the distribution of resources across educational sectors offered fewer answer categories 
in order to tease out more clearly the differences in preferences between vocational 
and academic education: “Provided you could choose the sector in which your taxes 
should be spent, which one would you select?” There were only two possible answers: 
Gymnasien and universities, on the one hand, or vocational training, on the other.7 The 
wording of this question thus forces respondents to prioritize between academic and 
vocational education.
The second dimension concerns the role of the state in financing education. In Swit­
zerland vocational/professional education is mostly privately financed (either by the 
student or by the firm), while academic or general education (Gymnasien and universi­
ties) are publicly financed. In order to analyze the financing preferences, we used four 
questions that refer to different types of education, i.e., vocational or general academic. 
The advantage of using four different specific questions instead of a single general one 
is that it allowed us to better check the consistency of the response patterns and avoid 
results that would be based on framing effects. 
The questions were as follows:
“Do you think that the state should pay for higher vocational/professional training?”  –
– “Yes/No”8
4 All the questions had been pretested in order to ensure that they were understood in the way the 
authors had intended them to be. 
5 This approach makes sense in the context of Switzerland with its highly developed system of 
direct democracy, where voters are frequently asked to express their views on similar questions 
at the polls. Direct democracy allows Swiss citizens to influence policy­making at almost every 
stage of decision­making through the right to propose new laws or the possibility to hinder new 
legislation by referendum. 
6 There is no exact equivalent across English­speaking countries to the Swiss Gymnasium. Gym-
nasien are upper secondary schools with limited access based on academic ability. They lead up 
to the Matura (baccalaureate), which qualifies for admission to the university system.
7 In both questions the respondents could choose only one answer category. The alternative to 
invest “equally in all sectors” was not included because we supposed that a large part of the re­
spondents would have chosen this answer, which would not have been very informative for our 
purposes of contrasting different types of education. Also, we think that having to make choices 
corresponds more closely to real political decisions. 
8 ISCED stands for International Standard Classification of Education. In contrast to academic 
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“Do you think that students attending universities and universities of applied scien­ –
ces should pay most of their education costs through fees and tuition?” – “Yes/No”
“Do you think that the private sector invests enough in vocational training?” – “Yes/ –
No”
“Do you think that the public sector invests enough in vocational training schools?”  –
– “Yes/No”
Contrary to the first block of questions, these questions do not only ask which types 
of education (here, vocational vs. academic) the respondent prefers to see financed by 
public investments but also about the role and the degree of involvement of the state 
relative to the private sector. 
Section 3 pointed out that the association between the individuals’ educational back­
ground and education policy preferences could be quite ambiguous. In order to test the 
hypotheses presented there, we created four education dummies based on the highest 
level of education attained and following standard degree classification. The first dum­
my is compulsory school, which includes people who just completed primary school or 
lower secondary school. The dummy apprenticeship includes all people who completed 
a vocational training at the upper secondary level, the dummy tertiary nonacademic 
includes all people who completed vocational training at the tertiary level (this includes 
higher degrees in vocational/professional training [ISCED 5B], universities of applied 
sciences and teacher training colleges9). Finally, academic education includes all people 
with a diploma from a Gymnasium or a university degree.
With respect to income, respondents were asked about their net monthly household 
income, and each respondent could choose among five income classes. We generated a 
binary variable for each income category. Missing values were imputed using the Swiss 
Labor Force Survey as an information source.
In order to control for political orientation, we created three dummy variables: right, 
center, and left.10 The individuals were asked to indicate their political sympathies us­
ing an 11­point scale from 0 to 10, in which 0 represented the extreme left and 10 the 
extreme right. The indicator ‘right’ was created by assigning 1 to all people who ranked 
themselves with a 7 or higher; ‘left’ was created by assigning 1 to people who responded 
higher education (ISCED 5A) with low tuition costs, higher vocational/professional education 
(ISCED 5B) asks for a high share of private investment in Switzerland. 
9 Until 2002, teacher training was organized in some 150 decentralized education colleges at the 
upper secondary or tertiary levels. Since then, 18 new teacher­training colleges (Pädagogische 
Hochschulen) that enjoy the status of tertiary education institutions have replaced the old insti­
tutions. However, they are not entitled to award doctoral degrees as do academic universities. 
10 We include dummy variables instead of a linear predictor in order to allow for a flexible func­
tional form. We also tried the specification with a linear form. The results were not substantially 
different. Therefore, we kept the dummies, as this allows a numerical interpretation of the coef­
ficients.
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by giving themselves a 3 or lower. The rest (4, 5, 6) were classified as ‘center’ (the distri­
bution of the variable can be seen in Tables 1 and 2). The categorization of the variable 
has produced distributions that are compatible with the voter shares for political par­
ties that occupy the left, right, or middle positions on the political spectrum.
With regard to institutions, we created a variable that captures the importance of voca­
tional training in a Canton, namely the proportion of the total population in the canton 
with a vocational training degree as their highest educational degree (Bundesamt für 
Statistik 2008).
The main control variables, apart from education, income, partisan affiliation, and in­
stitutions, are age, gender, language region, school­age children (whether the respon­
dent has children in school), and residence (whether the respondent lives in a city, an 
agglomeration, or a rural area).
Furthermore, we also included a control question on each individual’s general willing­
ness to increase educational spending, which could also be related to, for example, par­
tisan affiliation or income level. The exact question read: “Assume you have to vote in a 
cantonal referendum on a proposition calling for a 10­percent increase of educational 
expenditures to improve the teacher/child ratio in elementary and secondary schools. 
If the vote were today, would you support the initiative/proposition, yes or no?”11 The 
inclusion of this control variable also partially solves the potential problem of endo­
geneity, i.e., the fact that strong support for more public spending constitutes partisan 
affiliation and not vice versa. It should also be noted that the inclusion of the spending 
propensity variable is not a causal statement. Instead, it is supposed to take out the 
variation in the dependent variable that can be attributed to some kind of intrinsic mo­
tivation to increase spending in order to get a cleaner estimate of the effect of the other 
independent variables.12
11 Initiatives with similar propositions have been put to a vote in several Swiss cantons in recent 
years. Therefore, the question can be regarded as a realistic one in the Swiss political context. 
 We used the canton as the political and geographical area because, in most cantons, such mea­
sures are voted on at the cantonal level. School districts have various degrees of freedom to 
implement measures and to run schools, but in most cantons they cannot decide on the overall 
amount of resources devoted to education. Even if school districts or communities in most can­
tons raise taxes to pay for education, the level of funding and spending is decided at the cantonal 
level in order to ensure equity in the provision of education.
12 As can be seen below, the inclusion of this variable does not have an impact on the statistical 
significance and direction of the other independent variables, indicating that not including this 
variable would not cause an omitted variable bias and that including it does not cause a prob­
lem of multicollinearity.
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5 Descriptive data
Tables 1 and 2 provide the descriptive summary of the data. To simplify the analysis of 
the first question, we merged preschool, primary, and lower secondary school into one 
category (compulsory school), and tertiary education (including universities, universi­
ties of applied science and teacher training colleges) and Gymnasien into another one 
(tertiary education). The results in Table 1 show that 56 percent of the respondents 
would prefer to assign more funds to compulsory school, while only 8 percent of the 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics: Which sector should be promoted? (in percent)
Compulsory 
schooling
Vocational 
training
Tertiary 
education
Continuing 
education
Total 
(percentage)
Male 0.52
(0.02)
0.24
(0.01)
0.09
(0.01)
0.15
(0.01)
1009
50%
Female 0.59
(0.02)
0.22
(0.01)
0.06
(0.01)
0.13
(0.01)
1016
50%
Compulsory school 0.57
(0.02)
0.27
(0.02)
0.05
(0.01)
0.11
(0.01)
495
24%
Apprenticeship 0.52
(0.02)
0.24
(0.01)
0.08
(0.01)
0.16
(0.01)
961
47%
Tertiary nonacademic 0.63
(0.03)
0.19
(0.02)
0.07
(0.01)
0.11
(0.02)
339
17%
Tertiary academic 0.55
(0.03)
0.17
(0.03)
0.14
(0.02)
0.14
(0.02)
230
11%
Income < 3000 CHF 0.54
(0.03)
0.24
(0.03)
0.09
(0.02)
0.13
(0.02)
231
11%
Income 3000–5000 CHF 0.55
(0.02)
0.25
(0.02)
0.07
(0.01)
0.13
(0.02)
483
24%
Income 5000–7000 CHF 0.55
(0.02)
0.22
(0.02)
0.07
(0.01)
0.16
(0.02)
521
26%
Income 7000–9000 CHF 0.57
(0.03)
0.22
(0.02)
0.07
(0.01)
0.14
(0.02)
398
20%
Income > 9000 CHF 0.56
(0.03)
0.22
(0.02)
0.11
(0.02)
0.11
(0.02)
392
19%
Right 0.52
(0.03)
0.26
(0.02)
0.09
(0.01)
0.13
(0.02)
516
25%
Left 0.62
(0.03)
0.19
(0.02)
0.08
(0.01)
0.11
(0.02)
356
18%
Center 0.55
(0.03)
0.23
(0.02)
0.07
(0.01)
0.15
(0.02)
1153
57%
Children in school 0.59
(0.02)
0.25
(0.02)
0.06
(0.01)
0.10
(0.01)
701
35%
No children in school 0.54
(0.01)
0.22
(0.01)
0.08
(0.01)
0.16
(0.01)
1324
65%
Vocational training rate 0.74
(0.31)
0.70
(1.04)
0.71
(0.54)
0.73
(0.66)
73%
Total 0.55 0.23 0.08 0.14
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
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respondents would support an increase in expenditures for academic education. The 
support for academic education amongst those with a tertiary academic degree is above 
the mean, whereas the opposite is true for people with just compulsory schooling. The 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics: Who should pay for the different educational costs? (in percent)
Voc rather 
than general 
educ 
(1)
Higher 
voc educ 
financed by 
public funds 
(2)
Students 
should pay 
fees 
(3)
Private 
sector invests 
enough in 
voc educ 
(4)
Public sector 
invests 
enough in 
voc schools 
(5)
Male 0.88
(0.01)
0.61
(0.02)
0.50
(0.02)
0.35
(0.02)
0.54
(0.02)
Female 0.86
(0.01)
0.64
(0.02)
0.44
(0.02)
0.23
(0.01)
0.40
(0.02)
Compulsory school 0.92
(0.01)
0.63
(0.02)
0.56
(0.02)
0.41
(0.02)
0.52
(0.03)
Apprenticeship 0.88
(0.01)
0.60
(0.02)
0.48
(0.02)
0.30
(0.02)
0.48
(0.02)
Tertiary nonacademic 0.86
(0.02)
0.67
(0.03)
0.43
(0.03)
0.20
(0.02)
0.41
(0.03)
Tertiary academic 0.74
(0.03)
0.68
(0.03)
0.33
(0.03)
0.20
(0.03)
0.47
(0.04)
Income < 3000 0.85
(0.02)
0.62
(0.03)
0.53
(0.03)
0.27
(0.03)
0.41
(0.04)
Income 3000–5000 0.90
(0.01)
0.67
(0.02)
0.47
(0.02)
0.30
(0.02)
0.48
(0.03)
Income 5000–7000 0.90
(0.01)
0.62
(0.02)
0.50
(0.02)
0.33
(0.02)
0.49
(0.03)
Income 7000–9000 0.87
(0.02)
0.63
(0.03)
0.41
(0.03)
0.27
(0.02)
0.47
(0.03)
Income > 9000 0.82
(0.02)
0.59
(0.03)
0.47
(0.03)
0.29
(0.02)
0.52
(0.03)
Right 0.88
(0.02)
0.54
(0.02)
0.54
(0.02)
0.39
(0.02)
0.55
(0.03)
Left 0.84
(0.02)
0.75
(0.02)
0.33
(0.03)
0.14
(0.02)
0.37
(0.03)
Center 0.88
(0.01)
0.62
(0.01)
0.48
(0.02)
0.30
(0.01)
0.48
(0.02)
Children in school 0.86
(0.01)
0.64
(0.02)
0.39
(0.02)
0.23
(0.02)
0.43
(0.02)
No children in school 0.88
(0.01)
0.62
(0.01)
0.52
(0.01)
0.33
(0.01)
0.50
(0.02)
Vocational training rate 0.73
(0.03)
0.71
(0.03)
0.75
(0.03)
0.75
(0.04)
0.75
(0.04)
Total 0.87 0.63 0.47 0.30 0.48
Notes: (1) Provided you could choose the sector in which your taxes should be spent, which one would 
you select? General education or Vocational training; (2) Do you think that the state should pay for 
higher vocational/professional training? Yes/No; (3) Do you think that students attending universities and 
universities of applied sciences should pay most of their study costs through fees and tuition? Yes/No (4) Do 
you think that the private sector invests enough in vocational training? Yes/No (5) Do you think that the 
public sector invests enough in vocational training schools? Yes/No. Standard errors in parentheses.
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difference in support between the groups is statistically significant. Income, however, 
does not seem to explain differences in the preferences. Right­wing voters are more 
likely to support apprenticeships (vocational education) than voters with preferences 
for leftist positions. People with children in school are more likely to support extra 
funds directed to compulsory schooling, while they prefer less public money invested 
in continuing education, in comparison to people who do not have children or have 
children who are not attending school.
Regarding the questions about who should finance the costs of education, i.e., whether 
they should be borne mostly by the private sector or by the state, the results show that 
about 60 percent of the respondents would like higher vocational/professional training 
degrees to be financed by public funds, almost half of the respondents think students at 
universities and universities of applied sciences should pay for their study with higher 
tuition fees, half of the respondents think that the state invests enough in vocational 
training schools, but only 30 percent think that this is the case with respect to the pri­
vate economy. Concerning the questions related to the financing of education, i.e., our 
second set of questions, Table 2 shows that there are significant differences between po­
litical ideologies, with voters of the right being satisfied with the level of public and pri­
vate investments. People with compulsory schooling only and people without children 
in school show a greater, statistically significant inclination to support the proposal that 
academic students should pay higher tuition fees. They are also more satisfied with the 
amount of private investment made in vocational training compared with individuals 
holding tertiary degrees and those having children in school, respectively.
Descriptive results seem to indicate that it is primarily the educational background of 
voters and the fact of having school­age children that matters most in explaining differ­
ences in educational preferences and the ways to finance education. Political affiliation 
seems to be important only for determining how education expenditures should be 
financed. However, it might be that several of the independent variables are correlated, 
i.e., people with a certain educational background are more likely to have a certain 
political ideology. Therefore we use multivariate analyses in order to study the effect of 
each of these factors separately (ceteris paribus).
6 Empirical results
The hypotheses concerning individual preferences for public spending in education, 
outlined in Section 3, are studied here using standard multivariate econometric tech­
niques. 
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Which educational sector should receive more public funding in the future?
To analyze this first dimension, we posed two questions. In the first one, respondents 
were asked which educational sector should have the highest priority in the allocation 
of public money in the future. We grouped the possible answers in four categories: 
compulsory schooling, apprenticeship training (upper­secondary­level, firm­based, 
and basic vocational training), tertiary education (including Gymnasien, higher voca­
tional training, teacher training, and universities), and continuing education. We use 
a standard multinomial logit model that allows us to evaluate the relative impact of 
spending public funds for each of the educational levels (with tertiary education as the 
reference category).
The results are presented in Table 3. Specification 3 shows that respondents with an 
academic education (Gymnasium or academic university degree) are less willing to pri­
oritize educational spending on compulsory schooling or apprenticeship training over 
an increase in spending on tertiary education as compared with people with nonaca­
demic education. The probability of favoring investment in compulsory schooling is 
56 percent for the highly educated, whereas this probability is 60 percent for people 
with basic school qualifications. People with compulsory school and apprenticeship 
as their highest level of completed education are also more likely to support spending 
on apprenticeship training (about 26 and 24 percent, respectively). This is in line with 
the hypothesis that individuals prefer to assign resources to the educational sector that 
corresponds to their own educational trajectory. Interestingly, people who completed 
a nonacademic tertiary education are also more willing to support increases of public 
funds assigned to apprenticeship relative to tertiary education as compared with people 
with an academic educational background. The predicted probability of people who 
completed a tertiary academic level to choose funding for tertiary education is approxi­
mately 17 percent, while this probability is 19 percent for people with a tertiary nonaca­
demic degree. This means respondents with an academic background have 2 percentage 
points less probability of supporting apprenticeships. 
Neither income levels nor political preferences – once controlled for educational back­
ground – seem to explain differences in the response patterns. Educational institutions 
and traditions of the canton of residence, however, have a significant influence. Re­
spondents who live in cantons where vocational training is more common give greater 
support to spending extra money on apprenticeship training or compulsory schooling 
relative to tertiary education. The age of the respondent also matters; somewhat surpris­
ingly, the older the person is, the more likely this person prefers investment in tertiary 
education. Therefore, there is no evidence that the support for vocational education or 
apprenticeship training stems primarily from the older and more tradition­oriented 
share of the population. Respondents with children in school have – as one could expect 
– a higher preference for spending public money on compulsory schooling than on ter­
tiary education but are indifferent in the choice between vocational training and tertia­
ry education. Also surprisingly, respondents living in the French­ and Italian­speaking 
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cantons (Latin cantons), who generally share a lack of cultural affinity to the Germanic 
model of apprenticeship training, are more willing to invest in apprenticeship training 
than in tertiary education; this difference between the language regions is significant in 
models with or without controls for the share of people having a vocational education 
degree in the canton of residence. Specifically, individuals from the French­ and Italian­
speaking regions have a 16­percentage­point greater probability of supporting appren­
ticeship than individuals from the German­speaking regions. It shows that the support 
for apprenticeship training does not have to rely solely on tradition. 
Table 3 To which education sector should more public resources be assigned?
(1) (2) (3)
Compulsory schooling
Right –.343*
(.202)
–.419**
(.209)
–.192
(.176)
Left .0476
(.241)
.113
(.246)
.119
(.255)
Compulsory school 1.19***
(.323)
1.07***
(.342)
Apprenticeship .429*
(.249)
.277
(.298)
Tertiary, nonacademic .837***
(.306)
.713***
(.212)
Income 3000–5000 CHF .459
(.322)
.307
(.418)
Income 5000–7000 CHF .443
(.314)
.16
(.342)
Income 7000–9000 CHF .593*
(.334)
.267
(.411)
Income > 9000 CHF .158
(.317)
–.218
(.466)
Vocational training rate .0315**
(.0158)
Children in school .317**
(.149)
Age –.021***
(.00509)
Male –.514***
(.191)
Latin Switzerland –.0703
(.458)
Rural areas .0467
(.322)
Small town –.144
(.177)
Constant 2.04***
(.121)
1.12***
(.343)
.507
(1.14)
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The second question in this first dimension investigates the concrete division of public 
resources between vocational education and training, on one side, and academic edu­
cational pathways (Gymnasien and academic universities), on the other. This issue is 
addressed directly by asking people which of the two sectors they would give the highest 
priority when it came to spending public money. The two possible answers were either 
Gymnasien and universities or vocational education and training (which includes basic 
and higher vocational education and training). We analyze the probability of choosing 
vocational education and training over academic education using a standard probit 
model (see Table 4).
Table 3 continued
(1) (2) (3)
Apprenticeship
Right –.168
(.218)
–.211
(.225)
–.0943
(.179)
Left –.249
(.266)
–.113
(.272)
–.128
(.308)
Compulsory school 1.5***
(.359)
1.47***
(.341)
Apprenticeship .783***
(.289)
.714**
(.331)
Tertiary, nonacademic .805**
(.351)
.762**
(.315)
Income 3000–5000 CHF .52
(.347)
.479
(.329)
Income 5000–7000 CHF .356
(.341)
.257
(.296)
Income 7000–9000 CHF .506
(.362)
.378
(.352)
Income >9000 CHF .111
(.348)
–.00953
(.415)
Vocational training rate .0354**
(.0152)
Children in school .282
(.21)
Age –.0142***
(.00504)
Male –.322
(.237)
Latin Switzerland .91*
(.477)
Rural areas .0946
(.374)
Small town –.0265
(.278)
Constant 1.17***
(.131)
.0137
(.387)
–1.91*
(1.05)
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Most of the variation in the preferences can be explained once again by the educational 
background of the respondents. All respondents without an academic university degree 
are significantly more likely to prefer investments in vocational education and train­
ing over academic education. People without academic degrees are between 7 and 11 
Table 3 continued
(1) (2) (3)
Continuing education
Right –.415*
(.241)
–.401
(.247)
–.31
(.219)
Left –.313
(.289)
–.23
(.294)
–.199
(.288)
Compulsory school .704*
(.385)
.54
(.336)
Apprenticeship .449
(.304)
.323
(.371)
Tertiary, nonacademic .432
(.375)
.33
(.26)
Income 3000–5000 CHF .458
(.378)
.394
(.515)
Income 5000–7000 CHF .514
(.368)
.404
(.394)
Income 7000–9000 CHF .55
(.392)
.435
(.348)
Income >9000 –.194
(.388)
–.312
(.549)
Vocational training rate .0409**
(.0194)
Children in school –.32*
(.192)
Age –.0172***
(.00501)
Male –.301
(.194)
Latin Switzerland .621
(.523)
Rural areas .282
(.357)
Small town .117
(.246)
Constant .719*** –.0118 –1.92
(.139) (.415) (1.48)
Log Likelihood –2139.9508 –2116.8919 –2059.8782
Observations 1889 1889 1889
Notes: Multinomial logit of the probability of choosing a certain education sector. 
Reference group: tertiary education including higher vocational education. Log likelihood 
of constant-only model: –2139.9508. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < .1, ** p < .05, 
*** p < .01.
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percentage points more likely to choose vocational education and training. Addition­
ally, the income level plays a significant role for choosing priorities, with lower income 
categories having a stronger preference for vocational types of education relative to 
academic education even after having controlled for educational attainment. People 
with monthly income under 7,000 CHF are about 5 percentage points more willing to 
support vocational education.
Table 4 Probit model of the probability of preferring to allocate more 
 resources to vocational education: Marginal effects
(1) (2) (3)
Right .00446
(.0189)
.00455
(.019)
.00361
(.0194)
Left –.0368*
(.0236)
–.0181
(.0224)
–.0146
(.0221)
Compulsory school .114***
(.0182)
.109***
(.0185)
Apprenticeship .0982***
(.0235)
.0927***
(.0234)
Tertiary, nonacademic .0726***
(.0193)
.0696***
(.0195)
Income 3000–5000 CHF .0485*
(.0237)
.0454*
(.0243)
Income 5000–7000 CHF .0529**
(.0237)
.0487*
(.0247)
Income 7000–9000 CHF .0344
(.0252)
.0312
(.0266)
Income > 9000 CHF .00484
(.0282)
.0045
(.0296)
Vocational training rate .00041
(.00131)
Children in school –.0234
(.0322)
Age –.00982
(.0177)
Male .00017
(.000513)
Latin Switzerland .00679
(.0162)
Rural areas .0369*
(.0194)
Small town .0135
(.0191)
Log Likelihood –686.24391 –666.05725 –661.64483
Observations 1786 1786 1786
Notes: Log likelihood of constant-only model: –687.84. Standard errors of marginal effects 
in parentheses. * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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Who should pay for the education costs?
The second issue concerns the role of the state in financing education, which is analyzed 
using the four questions described in Section 4. The first one concerns the choice of 
sources (public vs. private) for funding higher vocational/professional education (ISCED 
5B). Table 5 shows that, in contrast to the questions regarding the preferences in select­
ing the educational sector on which to spend public money, political preferences matter 
considerably when explaining differences concerning the role of the state in the funding 
of education. As outlined in the hypotheses, people who identify themselves more with 
the political right are less likely to support an increase of public financing for higher 
vocational/professional training compared with people who sympathize with parties 
at the center or on the left of the political spectrum. Specifically, people who position 
themselves on the right side of the political spectrum are about 7 percentage points less 
likely to support more state spending on higher vocational training than people from 
the center. Educational and economic backgrounds do not explain much of the differ­
ences, ceteris paribus. One exception is the case of people who have a basic vocational 
training certificate. Surprisingly, these people are less supportive of the state allocating 
more funds to higher vocational/professional education. One explanation could be that 
this category of people is made up of those who could have obtained a degree in higher 
vocational education but did not and therefore do not want to fund something they 
have more or less explicitly not wanted for themselves or unsuccessfully tried to achieve.
Respondents who are favorable to greater public educational spending in general are 
also more likely to be in favor of more public funds for higher vocational/professional 
education. By controlling for an overall preference for spending more on education we 
ruled out some of the potential bias in the interpretation of the other variables since 
the differences in the preferences between public and private financing for higher vo­
cational/professional education could simply reflect general differences concerning the 
levels of public funding of education.
The next question asked the respondents whether students attending universities and 
universities of applied sciences should bear a greater part of their educational costs by 
paying higher tuition fees. The results of the probit model are shown in Table 6. Once 
again, political preferences have a big influence on the response patterns. Respondents 
with preferences for the right of the political spectrum prefer bigger private contribu­
tions, whereas those on the left of the spectrum prefer no change to the actual situation 
of low tuition fees. Respondents with compulsory schooling only or a basic vocational 
training certificate are more likely to support the initiative to increase tuition fees. Peo­
ple from the French­ or Italian­speaking regions prefer that universities are publicly 
funded (2 percentage points less likely to choose the alternative that students pay higher 
fees), the same as people who support increases in public spending in education in gen­
eral – which shows at least consistency in the response behavior of those surveyed.
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The next two questions inquire into the opinion of respondents on whether the private 
sector invests enough in vocational education and training (Table 7) and whether the 
government spends enough for vocational schools (Table 8).
Table 5 Probit model of the probability of wanting the state to pay for higher vocational 
 education: Marginal effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Right –.0775***
(.0272)
–.0814***
(.0279)
–.0934***
(.0288)
–.0734**
(.0303)
Left .131***
(.0288)
.123***
(.0294)
.115***
(.0299)
.116***
(.0313)
Compulsory school –.0427
(.0437)
–.0199
(.0439)
–.024
(.046)
Apprenticeship –.09**
(.0384)
–.0747*
(.039)
–.0704*
(.0403)
Tertiary, nonacademic –.0163
(.0444)
–.0025
(.0446)
–.00113
(.0459)
Income 3000–5000 CHF .0524
(.0402)
.0669
(.0407)
.0436
(.045)
Income 5000–7000 CHF .00793
(.0407)
.0392
(.0418)
.0226
(.0455)
Income 7000–9000 CHF .00455
(.0429)
.0332
(.0445)
.0122
(.0482)
Income > 9000 CHF –.0329
(.0445)
.000231
(.0461)
–.0224
(.0499)
Vocational training rate –.00353*
(.00205)
–.00419*
(.00214)
Latin Switzerland .106**
(.0437)
.11**
(.0454)
Children in school .00462
(.0257)
.00274
(.027)
Age .000417
(.000749)
.000551
(.000794)
Male –.0264
(.0239)
–.0111
(.0252)
Rural areas –.0592*
(.0309)
–.044
(.0327)
Small town –.00859
(.0298)
.0197
(.0313)
Increase in educ. expenditures .131***
(.0277)
Log likelihood –1206.9029 –1200.0094 –1170.4045 –1056.5737
Observations 1852 1852 1852 1696
Notes: Log likelihood of constant-only model: –1224.9594. Standard errors of marginal effects in parentheses. 
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.
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The significant differences in the response patterns relate mainly to political preferences 
and the language region of residence. Respondents who live in the Latin cantons and 
those having preferences for the left on the political spectrum think that both the pri­
vate sector and the government should invest more in vocational education and train­
ing. In contrast, respondents with compulsory education or a basic vocational training 
certificate are significantly more satisfied with the current levels of private engagement 
in vocational education and training. 
Table 6 Probit model of the probability of wanting that university students pay for most of 
 their costs: Marginal effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Right .0572**
(.0278)
.0575**
(.0286)
.0582*
(.0299)
.0488
(.0315)
Left –.155***
(.0304)
–.135***
(.0314)
–.123***
(.0322)
–.115***
(.0336)
Compulsory school .206***
(.0427)
.182***
(.0443)
.159***
(.0465)
Apprenticeship .139***
(.0396)
.124***
(.0407)
.104**
(.0418)
Tertiary, nonacademic .105**
(.0453)
.0956**
(.0465)
.0767
(.0477)
Income 3000–5000 CHF –.0515
(.0418)
–.0571
(.0434)
–.0449
(.0469)
Income 5000–7000 CHF –.0223
(.0418)
–.0403
(.0439)
–.0214
(.0472)
Income 7000–9000 CHF –.0899**
(.0434)
–.0974**
(.0461)
–.0795
(.0493)
Income > 9000 CHF –.0166
(.0453)
–.035
(.0481)
–.0351
(.051)
Vocational training rate .00147
(.00212)
.0016
(.00219)
Latin Switzerland –.215***
(.0447)
–.206***
(.0466)
Children in school –.0567**
(.0268)
–.0542*
(.0279)
Age .00206***
(.00079)
.00209**
(.000833)
Male .0538**
(.025)
.0442*
(.0263)
Rural areas .0453
(.0323)
.0179
(.0342)
Small town .0117
(.0311)
–.0152
(.0325)
Increase in educ. expenditures –.117***
(.0282)
Log likelihood –1261.9612 –1245.908 –1185.6617 –1075.9717
Observations 1851 1851 1851 1691
Notes: Log likelihood of constant-only model: –1280.1482. Standard errors of marginal effects in parentheses. 
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.
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Table 7 Probit model of the probability of thinking that the private sector invests enough in 
 vocational education: Marginal effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Right .0797***
(.0264)
.0747***
(.027)
.0648**
(.0275)
.0535*
(.0285)
Left –.167***
(.0252)
–.148***
(.0264)
–.145***
(.0265)
–.143***
(.0274)
Compulsory school .204***
(.0468)
.181***
(.0472)
.171***
(.0488)
Apprenticeship .0972**
(.0389)
.0963**
(.0391)
.0743*
(.0398)
Tertiary, nonacademic .000638
(.0451)
.00427
(.0454)
–.021
(.0448)
Income 3000–5000 CHF .0421
(.0432)
.0239
(.0435)
.00809
(.0453)
Income 5000–7000 CHF .0627
(.0431)
.0381
(.0439)
.0209
(.0457)
Income 7000–9000 CHF .0214
(.0444)
.00484
(.0456)
.00186
(.0475)
Income > 9000 CHF .0605
(.0469)
.0277
(.0478)
.0104
(.0491)
Vocational training rate .0000507
(.00203)
–.0000161
(.00208)
Latin Switzerland –.154***
(.0395)
–.151***
(.0405)
Children in school –.0392
(.0246)
–.0437*
(.0254)
Age .000809
(.000725)
.000692
(.000758)
Male .0893***
(.0229)
.0691***
(.0239)
Rural areas .0047
(.0295)
–.00323
(.0306)
Small town .0112
(.0288)
.00355
(.0297)
Increase in educ. expenditures –.125***
(.0267)
Log likelihood –1029.5304 –1010.1298 –975.66723 –878.64747
Observations 1744 1744 1744 1608
Notes: Log likelihood of constant-only model: –1058.3074. Standard errors of marginal effects in parentheses. 
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.
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Table 8 Probit model of the probability of thinking that the public sector invests enough in 
 vocational training schools: Marginal effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Right .077**
(.0316)
.0673**
(.0325)
.0515
(.0334)
.0365
(.0347)
Left –.107***
(.0363)
–.0992***
(.037)
–.0897**
(.0376)
–.0767*
(.0388)
Compulsory school .0478
(.0509)
.0363
(.0517)
.0261
(.0535)
Apprenticeship .00775
(.0455)
.0104
(.0462)
.000967
(.0476)
Tertiary, nonacademic –.0674
(.0516)
–.0622
(.0525)
–.0663
(.0539)
Income 3000–5000 CHF .0793
(.05)
.0631
(.051)
.0873
(.054)
Income 5000–7000 CHF .0792
(.0496)
.0547
(.0511)
.0674
(.0542)
Income 7000–9000 CHF .0674
(.0525)
.0542
(.0546)
.0767
(.0574)
Income > 9000 CHF .119**
(.0525)
.0978*
(.0548)
.113*
(.0576)
Vocational training rate .00222
(.00244)
.00236
(.0025)
Latin Switzerland –.0729
(.0538)
–.0775
(.0549)
Children in school –.0263
(.0304)
–.0175
(.0315)
Age .00103
(.000889)
.00078
(.000931)
Male .108***
(.028)
.104***
(.0291)
Rural areas .0112
(.0359)
.00446
(.0373)
Small town .0413
(.0352)
.0324
(.0364)
Increase in educ. expenditures –.072**
(.031)
Log likelihood –969.90536 –964.75969 –945.79289 –881.75509
Observations 1415 1415 1415 1323
Notes: Log likelihood of constant-only model: –979.57287. Standard errors of marginal effects in parentheses. 
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.
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7 Summary and conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed the determinants of preferences on education policy, 
both with regard to the distribution of public moneys across educational sectors and 
to the general level of public investment relative to the private funding of education. 
Our main focus of analysis has been the difference between vocational and academic 
types of education. Summarizing our findings, we can state that differences in educa­
tion policy preferences concerning the types of education to promote can be explained 
by individual educational background. Individuals tend to support the concentration 
of resources in those sectors that are closest to their own educational trajectories. Parti­
san ideology cannot explain these differences in support for vocational training versus 
academic education. However, when it comes to the level of public investment in hu­
man capital formation, partisan ideology emerges as the strongest predictor, whereas 
educational background and income account for much less of the variation of indi­
vidual preferences in this dimension. Interestingly, this left–right division is not about 
the division of labor between the state and the economy in the financing of education, 
but rather about the distribution of costs between the individual, on the one hand, and 
the state and the economy, on the other. That is, proponents of the left demand more 
investment in education both from the state and from the private sector, but they op­
pose a rise in individual tuition fees. One can interpret this as a preference for collective 
responsibilities versus individual ones.
We also find that cultural differences and traditions matter in some of the explanations 
of preference differences. Respondents in cantons with a higher share of vocational edu­
cation show stronger preference for the development of apprenticeship training rela­
tive to tertiary education, and residents in Latin cantons show preferences for a stronger 
public responsibility relative to an individual one, even after having controlled for politi­
cal orientation. The latter shows impressively that general or culturally transmitted at­
titudes concerning the role of the public and the private sectors can dominate individual 
and topic­related differences. It also shows that individual or collective experience with 
vocational forms of education matters, relative to academic education, for the degree of 
support of vocational education, although this is not the only determining factor.
What are possible avenues for future research? Obviously, it would be very worthwhile 
to expand the study of education policy preference from Switzerland to other countries 
or the universe of developed (e.g., OECD or EU) countries as a whole. This could, for 
example, shed light on the question of how much of the support for a particular type of 
education is rooted in the experiences with these types of education and how open societ­
ies are to forms of education that are less common in their national context. The case of 
Switzerland, in conjunction with a few other countries such as Germany and Austria, may 
be different in kind from the other OECD countries, because vocational training is well 
developed and widely regarded as a viable alternative to school­based or academic educa­
tion. In countries without a well­developed vocational training system, the “prospect of 
upward mobility” might lead to stronger support of the less well­off for the expansion 
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of higher education. Unfortunately, data availability poses significant constraints on at­
tempts to test this hypothesis in an internationally comparative context. While data from 
the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) and the Eurobarometer might be used 
to study individual preferences for educational spending and the ranking of academic 
education over vocational training (Busemeyer 2010; Busemeyer/Jensen 2010), a prefer­
able option would be to conduct original country­level surveys similar to this one. This 
would allow for a more fine­grained analysis of individual and national preferences.
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